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I. INTRODUCTION:
THE "TWO ROADS" OF MANAGED CARE
"MANAGED CARE,"1 as the accompanying "Growth in
Managed Care" chart2 graphically shows, began about fifteen
years ago, and has been accelerating since the early 1990s:
1. See generally ROBERT W. McADAMs ET AL., MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS MANUAL
(1996), and part V, infra. This Article elaborates on some of the subjects covered in Charles D.
Weller, Health Care and Antitrust Policy at the Crossroads: Dangers and Opportunities (Nov.
1995 paper submitted to Fed. Trade Comm'n Hearings on Competition Policy in the New High-
Tech, Global Marketplace) [hereinafter Weller, Crossroads].
2. BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT FOR U.S.
PHARMACEUTICALS 18 (1993).
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Sources: Marion Merrill Dow Managed Care Digest: SMG Marketing: Opportunities Health Affairs; BCG analysis
Reprinted with permission of The Beton Consulting Group, "The Changing Environment for U.S. Pharmaceuticals" 1993.
It is driving the most profound and revolutionary change in
health care history, as incisively explained by Judge Melloy in
his Dubuque, Iowa hospital merger antitrust opinion:
3
Traditionally, hospitals competed on the basis of amenities and
perceptions of quality. Only in the last ten to fifteen years have
hospitals begun to compete on the basis of price. To a large de-
gree, this competition has occurred because of the arrival of
managed care.
Today, innovation and change in health care approaches that of
the personal computer and credit card markets, and the past is
not a prologue for the future.
Managed care, however, is new and only at the "Model T"
stage. Like the Model T, it has unleashed a private revolution.
The Model T, after all, was revolutionary in its day for con-
sumers and horseless carriage companies - and horse and
buggy manufacturers. As Judge Melloy pointed out, for the
first time in the history of American health insurance, large
doses of provider cost, price, quality, and service competition
are being applied because of managed care. Cost reimburse-
ment and Usual Customary and Reasonable (UCR) fees for
3. United States v. Mercy Health Serv., 902 F. Supp. 968,973 (N.D. Iowa 1995). See also
Bryan Gruley & Laurie McGinley, Rebuke in Dubuque, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1996, at I-A.
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providers have largely gone the way of the buggy whip. In
Antitrust 101 terms, there has been de facto deregulation of the
health care field, particularly in the last five years.4
One type of managed care, Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (HMOs), is well known. HMO enrollment, which is con-
centrated in California and a few other states, has doubled,
from about twenty-five to fifty million, in the last ten years.'
What is not so well-known, indeed it almost seems to be a
secret, is a second type of managed care: self-insured ERISA
(Employee Retirement Income Security Act) networks.6 This
second type of managed care, including self-insured Preferred
Provider Organizations (PPOs), are the dominant form of man-
aged care because of at least four factors: sheer numbers, rate
of growth, legal regulatory flexibility, and antitrust flexibility.
Self-insured employee plans of all types cover about 100
million people and pay over $100 billion a year in benefits of
all types.7 As the chart shows, PPO networks alone (1) cover
more people than HMOs, (2) have grown faster than HMOs,
and, (3) particularly important today, the self-insured ERISA
variety have much more legal flexibility than state-regulated
HMOs and insurance companies.8
As to antitrust flexibility, self-insured ERISA networks
took on even greater importance starting December 5, 1995.
On that date, Mark Whitener, the Deputy Director of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission's (FTC) Bureau of Competition, an-
nounced in a speech that the FTC has begun focusing on "the
needs of employers who offer self-funded health benefits
plans," which means the FTC will consider new ways to en-
courage provider networks without "capitation and similar risk
sharing."9 As a matter of antitrust law and policy, the federal
4. See, e.g., Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer's classic on the subject, STEPHEN
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) [hereinafter BREYER, REGULATION]. See also
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE Vicious CIRcLE (1993) and CHARLES SCHuLTZE, THE PUBLC
USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977).
5. See, e.g., MARION MERRILL Dow, MANAGED CARE DIGEST. HMO EDmoN-1994
(1995).
6. See parts II and VI, infra, for details.
7. See part II, infra.
8. Congress deliberately chose to subject ERISA plans to market regulation rather than
government regulation for most matters. See part Ill, infra.
9. Mark Whitener, Deputy Director, Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust, Medicare Re-
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antitrust agencies are likely to apply mainstream antitrust law
and thus less restrictive views that will unleash new competi-
tion by provider networks to serve self-insured health plans,
without the current legally unnecessary and impractical capita-
tion, risk-sharing, and "pure" messenger requirements.'0 Self-
insured ERISA networks, in addition, have added antitrust
protection and flexibility because of the National Cooperative
Research and Production Act of 1993 (NCRPA),11 which now
is being applied to the health care field without risk-sharing
potentially regulable by the state.12
Self-insured plans are profoundly different from HMOs in
a number of ways, 3 but two often overlooked differences are
particularly noteworthy: premiums and state regulation. First,
1IMOs and insured plans have premiums; self-insured plans do
not. Thus, self-insured plans have no cash reserves from which
to pay capitation to providers: no premium, no cash for capita-
tion.
Second, HMOs and insured plans are subject to state regu-
lation; self-insured ERISA plans largely are not. 4 Ironically,
the current push by state insurance and other government regu-
lators to increase regulation of managed care and capitated
plans is likely to have the opposite effect:' 5 the more regula-
form andHealth Care Competition, Remarks 16 (Dec. 5, 1995).
Note: This Article was written before the FED. TRADE CoMM'N AND DEPT OF JUST.,
STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLuCY IN HEALTH CARE was published in August
1996.
10. Seepart V1, infra.
I1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306 (1994).
12. Charles D. Weller et al., NCRPA Spells Immediate Antitrust Relief for Health Care
Providers, 5 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), at 1433 (1996).
13. There are other profound differences, including: (1) standardized benefit packages are
unnecessary, since the self-insured pool is not broken up and thus manipulating benefit plan terms
and exclusions to increase profits or reduce costs is never an issue; (2) adverse selection is not an
issue for the same reason; (3) no annual enrollment is necessary, since patients select providers
when they need them rather than annually when they select their HMO, and because a self-insured
plan's insurance pool is not broken up; (4) Primary Care Physicians (PCPs) and gatekeeping need
not be added to the benefit plan, thus avoiding difficult union negotiations for union plans;
avoiding a "take away" issue for most employees and their families, and allowing physicians to
practice together as teams; (5) "mature markets" are two-dimensional rather than one, since all
roads do not lead to HMOs; there is a second self-insured road; and (6) self-insured ERISA
networks can focus on marketing to customer needs, rather than selling what federal and state law
and regulators allow HMOs to sell. Marketing, rather than selling, is a key tenet of modem
management. See, e.g., PETER DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT 64 (1973). See also part VI, infra.
14. See part III, infra.
15. See part Ell, infra. Antitrust and economic history are filled with examples of increased
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tion, the more incentive there is to become or stay self-in-
sured. 16 Indeed, the more states try to regulate HMOs and
capitation, the more likely and quickly both will become like
buggy whips, the "wave of the past," rather than the "wave of
the future."
Accordingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom, man-
aged care is likely to evolve along two roads, HMOs and self-
insured plans, rather than one road with HMOs as the final
destination. The two roads diverge over premiums and state
regulation: one road, the HMO/capitation road, has premiums
and state regulation; the second road leads to self-insured
ERISA plans, which have no premiums and basically no state
regulation. Indeed, there appears to be an Achilles heel in the
common assumption that HMOs and capitation will become
widely used: state regulation and premiums.
This Article explores the second, less well-known road:
self-insured ERISA networks. Self-insured ERISA networks are
not the road less travelled, they are simply the road less
known. Self-insured ERISA networks have the legal flexibility
and sheer numbers to lead rather than follow the move from
the current "Model T" generation of managed care to the next
generation, likely to be known by a new and more patient-
friendly phrase like "patient choice."
II. THE END OF INSURANCE AND THE RISE OF
SELF-INSURANCE
A. Overview of Health Insurance Coverage in the United
States
Overall, U.S. health insurance coverage, and noncoverage,
breaks down approximately as follows: 7
government regulation providing incentives for innovators to find ways to escape government
regulation, and of regulated businesses and regulators cooperating to try to prevent or hobble new
competition. See generally FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID R. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d. ed. 1990).
16. As discussed in part mI, ERISA preemption is strongest for self-insured plans.
17. See, e.g., HEALTH INS. ASS'N OF AM., SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE
DATA-1994 33 (1995) [hereinafter HIAA SOURCE BOOK]. However, health care is plagued by
the same data problems faced by most fields in the midst of revolutionary change. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH W. DUNCAN & ANDREW C. GROSS, STATISTICS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1995); Christina
310 [V/ol. 6:305
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150 million-Employee health plans
30 million-Medicare (primarily over age 65)
20 million-Medicaid (primarily the poor)
15 million-Private individual coverage
35 million-Uninsured
250 million-Total
The single largest source of health insurance coverage in
the United States, in terms of people covered, is employment-
based. About 160 million people, two-thirds of the population,
are covered through public and private employment. Employee
health plans cover about 150 million people as active employ-
ees, plus another ten million retirees with Medicare Supple-
ment benefits, and the dependents of both."8
The average cost of employee health plan coverage is
about $4000 per year per employee (including dependents). 9
For self-insured plans, about ninety-five percent is paid for
health benefits, and five percent is paid to third-party adminis-
trators (TPAs). For HMOs and fully insured plans, about
eighty-five percent goes to health benefits and fifteen percent
to the insurer or HMO.
Of the payments to health care providers, about half are
for hospital care, twenty-five percent for physician care, and
twenty-five percent for other services:
25%--hospital inpatient
25%--hospital outpatient
25%-physician & other professionals
25%--drugs, lab & other
Duff, Government Statistics: Good Riddance to Bad Rubbish?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1995,
at B1; OMB Releases New Industry Classification System for Public Comment, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), at A-7 (July 26, 1995) (new SIC codes finally issued to replace SIC codes dating to the
1930s). Nonetheless, the conclusions reached here are sound even within large ranges. For
example, self-insured ERISA networks are very important, whether they cover 50 million or 100
million people.
18. Of the 30 million or so people with Medicare coverage, the "40-30-15-15" Rule
applies. About 40%, or 12 million, have Medicare Supplement benefits as a result of employment,
30% buy individual Medicare Supplements (a/k/a Medigap policies), 15% are covered by
Medicaid, and about 15% have no Medicare supplemental coverage. Interview with Dr. Gail
Wilenksy in Cleveland, Ohio, Dec. 1995. From a legal point of view, Congress chose the ERISA
deregulation model for employee Medigap plans, and a state and federal regulatory approach to
individual Medigap policies.
19. See, e.g., Employee Health-Care Costs Decline, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 14, 1995,
at 1-C.
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(These numbers are order of magnitude, and can vary substan-
tially in individual cases).
B. The End of Insurance and the Rise of Self-Insurance
A chart similar to the "Growth in Managed Care" chart
above could be drawn for the same time period charting the
decline of "insured" health plans, and the rise of "self-insur-
ance."
In the early 1980s, employee health plans began shifting
dramatically from fully insured health insurance to various
forms of self-insurance. Today, of the 160 million people with
employee plan coverage, about 100 million are covered by
self-insured plans."
"Self-insurance" includes a number of financial arrange-
ments:2"
1. No Insurance, where the employee plan is totally at
risk for all health claims.
2. Stop-Loss Insurance, where the employer or health
and welfare plan is insured for catastrophic cases above a cer-
tain stop-loss amount. There is no insurance below these stop-
loss limits, which is where the vast majority of claims fall.
3. Minimum Premium Insurance, which is similar to
stop-loss insurance.
4. HMO Prepayment. As noted earlier, about fifty mil-
lion people are enrolled in HMOs. In theory, HMOs are fully
insured plans. In practice, some have developed "self-insured"
products to be competitive, and some state regulators have
permitted this competitive practice.
Why the switch to self-insurance? The principal reason for
employee health plans switching to "self-insurance" was to
save state premium taxes of about three percent.' In today's
dollars, these savings are substantial. Employee health plans
save on the order of three billion dollars (three percent of $100
billion).
20. HIAA, SOURCE BOOK, supra note 17, at 38.
21. Id.at4-5, 14,190,195.
22. Patricia McDonnell et al., Self-Insured Health Plans, HEALTH CARE FIN. REv., Winter
1986, at 1; EBRI, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON HEALTH INsURANcE BENEFIT ISsUES (Aug.
1995); 12 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA), at 1326 (Sept. 30, 1985).
312 [Vol. 6:305
SELF-INSURED ERISA NETWORKS
III. ERISA PREEMPTION AND LEGAL FLEXIBILITY
A. Introduction
The differences in legal regulation between self-insured
ERISA plans, HMOs, and insured plans often is misunderstood
or ignored, but it is critical. Today, approximately 100 million
people in public and private employee health plans are in "self-
insured" plans, with most in health plans covered by ERISA.
The difference in legal flexibility, and thus the opportunity for
congressionally intended private innovation to occur for tens of
millions of people in self-insured ERISA plans is hard to over-
state.
B. Substantive and Procedural Flexibility
In 1975, Congress passed ERISA, among other things, to
deregulate employee health and welfare plans, and broadly to
preempt state laws that relate to employee benefit plans. Basi-
cally, although there are exceptions, ERISA preempts "any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan .... ."
There are two important dimensions to ERISA preemption,
substantive and procedural. First, substantively, ERISA's pre-
emption of state law has been broadly construed, particularly
for self-insured plans.24 Second, procedurally, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has determined that many disputes involving state
law and benefits do not have to be litigated in state court. They
can be removed to federal courts and litigated there.2
As a practical matter, this means that self-insured ERISA
plans, the single largest form of health coverage, and the doc-
tors, hospitals, carriers and others that serve them, can act
quickly, like personal computer makers and software compa-
nies, with a minimum of state and federal regulation and red
tape.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
24. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding insurance
company that insured a benefit plan entitled to ERISA preemption of all plaintiff's state law
claims). See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (holding self-
insured plans are not subject to "indirect" state insurance regulation, e.g., mandated benefit laws;
insured plans are); New York Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct.
1671 (1995) (finding no preemption has encouraged a flurry of state regulatory activity).
25. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
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HMOs and insured plans do not enjoy the same legal
flexibility. To illustrate, Ohio Revised Code Chapter 1742 and
42 CFR, Part 417, are the tip of the regulatory iceberg with
which federally qualified HMOs in Ohio must comply. None of
these complex regulations apply to self-insured ERISA plans.
Moreover, no other state's red tape applies in any of the other
states where employee plans and their labor union agreements,
if any, provide health benefits.
Although some argue that Congress should not have ex-
empted employers and employees from 1000 state-mandated
benefit laws and other varying and conflicting regulations and
costs, as discussed next, Congress carefully considered these
issues and chose ERISA preemption. Since many companies
operate nationally, this means they and their labor unions, as
applicable, can experiment with and lead private health care
innovation with a minimum of red tape. That is exactly what
they were doing for the first time in history, beginning just a
few years ago.
C. Any Willing Provider Laws
One of the important current issues relating to ERISA
preemption is whether ERISA preempts state "Any Willing
Provider" (AWP) laws when applied to HMOs, or insured
plans, or self-insured plans.' In earlier days, they were re-
ferred to as "open panel," "anti-closed panel," "free choice,"
and "mandatory provider" laws.27
Ultimately, the Supreme Court should find ERISA pre-
26. See, e.g., Cigna Healthplan of La. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
ERISA preempts Louisiana's AWP law); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Texas Pharmacy Ass'n, 907 F.
Supp. 1019 (W.D. Texas 1995) (holding ERISA does not preempt Texas' AWP pharmacy law),
affid as modified, 105 F.3d 1035 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding ERISA preempts current, but not prior,
statute); Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 579 (1993) (no preemption of Virginia's AWP law for insured plans).
Interestingly, a 1972 pre-ERISA case by the Supreme Court of Washington held that an
any-willing-optometrist law was unconstitutional under the contract and due process clauses.
Ketcham v. King County Med. Serv. Corp., 502 P.2d 1197, 1214 (Wash. 1972).
On the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which sometimes is relevant to interpreting ERISA
preemption, see generally Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption
for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L. J. 587 (1978).
27. See generally Charles D. Weller, Free Choice as a Restraint of Trade in American
Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IowA L. REv. 1351 (1984).
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emption for both prepaid and self-insured plans, based on the
language, history, and purpose of the law and earlier Supreme
Court rulings.
Both the House and Senate sponsors of ERISA,
Representative Williams and Senator Javits, expressly stated
that state laws of any kind that restricted the use of closed-pan-
els, or that mandate open-panels, would be preempted by
ERISA. This legislative history should make clear that ERISA
preempts state open-panel laws for insured (prepaid) and unin-
sured plans.
Senator Williams is frequently quoted by the Supreme
Court? for the proposition that Congress intended ERISA pre-
emption to be broad:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified
in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the
conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Fed-
eral regulation, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or in-
consistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.
This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all
actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality
thereof, which have the force or effect of law.29
Significantly, Senator Williams cited the specific example
of the type of state law ERISA was intended to preempt in his
very next sentence, the "closed panel," AWP-type laws:
Consistent with this principle, State professional associations
acting under the guise of State-enforced professional regulation,
should not be able to prevent unions and employers from main-
taining the types of employee benefit programs which Congress
has authorized - for example, prepaid legal services pro-
grams - whether closed or open panel - by Public Law 93-
95.
Similarly, Senator Javits made clear, on the same day, that
ERISA preempts state laws that restrict closed panel plans:
28. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 (1983); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987).
29. 120 CoNG. REc. 29933 (1974); 3 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93D CONG., LEGiSLATIVE -ISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETREmENT INcOME SECuRITY ACT OF 1974, at 4745-46 (1976) [hereinafter ERISA LEGIs.
HISTORY].
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[The State, directly or indirectly through the bar, is preempted
from regulating the form and content of a legal service plan, for
example, open versus closed panels, in the guise of disciplinary
or ethical rules or proceedings.'
Thus, although the Supreme Court's 1995 N.Y. Blues case
has been interpreted by some eager state regulators and legisla-
tures to allow extensive AWP and other regulation of ERISA
managed care plans,"1 it is likely that the Supreme Court will
rule that AWP laws are preempted by ERISA for self-insured
and "prepaid" plans, based on the language, history, and pur-
pose of the Act and the Court's precedent, coupled with the
adverse impact on employee plans.
IV. SELF-INSURED PLANS AND CAPITATION: NO
CASH
Capitation and other forms of risk-sharing are little used in
self-insured plans today because of numerous legal and busi-
ness reasons, discussed in more detail below. These same rea-
sons make it unlikely capitation ever will be widely used by
the self-insured plans that cover on the order of 100 million
people and pay more than $100 billion annually in benefit pay-
ments.
A. Cash Flow
As noted earlier, in self-insured plans there are no premi-
ums. Bills are paid from the employee health plan's bank ac-
count, not from insurance company or HMO funds. The cash
involved in paying the bills for the 100 million people in self-
insured health plans totals about $100 billion annually. Why
would employee plans be willing to lose the cash flow and pay
$100 billion to providers, in advance, in twelve monthly in-
stallments? Thus, cash flow reasons alone make a major shift
to capitation unlikely.
30. 120 CONG. REC. 15757 (1974); ERISA LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 29, at 4789
(emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., National Anti-Managed Care Laws Would Raise Health Costs, Study Says,
MANAGED CARE REP. (BNA), at 7 (July 5, 1995).
316 [Vol. 6:305
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B. ERISA Preemption of 1000 State Mandates
If capitation is "insurance," then employee health plans
will lose ERISA preemption, and be subject to more than 1000
state-mandated benefit laws. Not many plans want be involved
in litigating the issue, or losing it.
C. Premium Tax Savings
Similarly, if capitation is "insurance," then the employee
health plan may be subject to state premium taxes of, all told,
about three billion dollars annually. Again, few employee
health plans are willing to take this dollar or litigation risk.
D. State and Other Regulation
In August 1995, the staff of some state insurance depart-
ments strongly recommended that capitation and other risk-
sharing arrangements be regulated as the "business of insur-
ance."
32
As a matter of law, this interpretation seems overzealous
and unlikely to be sustained by the courts. It has long been the
law that the mere transfer of risk is not enough to establish
"insurance." As former insurance law professor, now judge,
Robert Keeton incisively explained, "all insurance contracts
concern risk transference, but not all contracts involving risk
transference are insurance."33
Furthermore, there are legal uncertainties regarding risk-
sharing under various Medicare and Medicaid laws. For exam-
ple, on December 1, 1994, new rules were proposed that im-
pose penalties for certain physician incentive plans that induce
physicians to reduce care and thus reduce costs.34 Similar
32. See, e.g., Overwhelming Opinion of NAIC Group That Provider Networks be Licensed,
4 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), at 1264 (Aug. 17, 1995). For the full text, see MCADAMS Er AL., supra
note 1. See also GROUP HEALTH ASS'N OF AM., PHOs AND THE ASSUMPTION OF INSURANCE RISK
(July 10, 1995); Georgia: PHO To Change Health Contract Clarifying That It Is Not Insurer, 4
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), at 1042 (July 6, 1995); Md. 90 Op. Att'y Gen. 030 (June 19, 1990)
(ruling certain provider risk-sharing arrangements to be the business of insurance).
33. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAw 12 (1988). This also is not a
new issue. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., Inc., 440 U.S. 205, 225-30
(1979).
34. See 59 Fed. Reg. 61,571 (Dec. 1, 1994).
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rules restricting physician incentive plans, including risk-shar-
ing, apply to HMOs. 5
Thus, there are several legal uncertainties, and regulators
who take the position that capitation and risk-sharing are the
"business of insurance," ironically, make capitation and risk-
sharing more risky, less desirable, and thus less likely, and
make self-insurance more desirable.
E. Adverse Selection
"Adverse selection" or "cream skimming" occurs when the
capitation payment is too high for a healthy person and too low
for somebody who is sick. The General Accounting Office
(GAO) recently issued a number of reports on the adverse
selection problem for Medicare's capitation program. The GAO
reported that the Medicare capitation program costs Medicare
at least $500 million a year, and perhaps as much as $2.5 bil-
lion, because of adverse selection.36
In short, it is technically difficult (some argue it is techni-
cally impossible) to develop individual capitation rates that
eliminate adverse selection risks, thus creating another
disincentive for self-insured employee health plans to use them.
F. Macro Versus Micro
Employers and employee health plans generally operate at
a "macro" level of total, annual budgeted costs rather than at
the "micro" level of capitated, "Per Member Per Month" or
"PMPM" ratings. Their cost focus is "What were total health
benefit costs last year, and what are they going to be this
year?"
Further, employee plans generally have little experience,
35. See 59 Fed. Reg. 36,072 (July 15, 1994).
36. U.S. GEN. Acr. OFFICE, No. T-HEHS 95-174, MEDICARE MANAGED CARE:
PROGRAM GROWTH HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO FiX HMO PAYMENT PROBLEMS 7, 13 (May 24, 1995);
U.S. GEN. AcCr. OFFICE, No. HEHS 96-21, MEDICARE MANAGED CARE: GROWING
ENROLLMENT ADDS URGENCY TO FIXING HMO PAYMENT PROBLEM (Nov. 1995). See, e.g.,
Medicare HMO Rates: Voodoo Methodology?, HEALTH POL'Y WEEK, Apr. 11, 1988, at 1;
Wynand P.M.M. van de Ven et al., Risk-Adjusted Capitation, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1994, at 120;
Joseph P. Newhouse, Rate Adjusters for Medicare Under Capitation, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV.,
Supp. 1986, at 45; Gerard F. Anderson et al., Paying for HMO Care: Issues and Options in
Setting Capitation Rates, 64 MILBANK Q. 548 (1986).
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interest, or capability to deal at the "micro" level of capitation.
Indeed, many employers I know have had bad experiences with
HMO "cream skimming." Many employers also recently had to
deal with the "micro" level of PMPM to comply with FAS
106, a new accounting standard for retiree medical benefits.
The task was time-consuming, costly, and of little or no ongo-
ing management value.
Finally, "cream skimming" makes it hazardous to the heal-
th (and career) of a benefits manager to go from the "macro"
level they know to the "micro" level they usually do not.
G. Controversial Incentives
Capitation arguably gives providers incentives not to pro-
vide needed care.38 Judge Richard Posner recently described
these "perverse incentives" in the HMO context: "the HMO's
incentive is to keep you healthy if it can but if you get very
sick, and are unlikely to recover to a healthy state involving
few medical expenses, to let you die as quickly and cheaply as
possible." 39 These quality concerns, as well as potential bad
publicity and increased legal risks, also chill interest in capita-
tion and risk-sharing.
H. Fifteen Percent Versus Five Percent
Most self-insured health plans' administrative costs are in
the neighborhood of five percent. Employee health plan execu-
tives read newspapers, and see profit margins on the order of
fifteen to twenty percent by HMOs and other capitated plans.
Why not keep the ten percent difference for the employee heal-
th plan?
I. No Proof It Works
Even though HMOs and capitation have been around for
more than fifty years, HMOs and other capitated plans today
37. See, e.g., William H. Steinbrink & Charles D. Weller, Volatile Accrual: What You Need
to Know About FAS 106, MGmT. REV., May 1993, at 59.
38. See, e.g., Cover Story; The Soul of an HMO, TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 44.
39. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410 (7th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1288 (1996).
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and for years have varied widely in their performance as to
total costs, utilization, and premiums.' Many employee health
plans have recently experienced better cost performance with
their self-insured networks than with HMOs. In short, there is
little or no proven correlation between capitation and perfor-
mance.
J. National Versus Local
Employers and unions, if applicable, generally desire uni-
form benefits in all their locations nationally. IMOs and in-
sured plans cannot deliver these uniform benefits, because each
state's laws vary and ERISA does not preempt state mandated
benefit laws for insured plans. It does for self-insured plans.
K. MIS Limitations
Capitation, risk-sharing, and withholds may be nice to
have in theory, but they cannot be administered by many exist-
ing computer systems. The reality is that very few TPAs or
carriers have the Management Information System (MIS) capa-
bility to handle capitation, withholds, or risk-sharing.
L. Complexity
The administrative complexity of paying different capita-
tion rates that adjust risk for age, sex, location, and other fac-
tors is another major impediment to widespread use by em-
ployee health plans.
These complexities are illustrated by a typical capita-
tion contract
Capitation Payment. On or before the tenth (10th) day of each
month, Network shall pay Physician the applicable capitation
payment below for the provision of Capitated Services to each
Covered Person who has selected Physician, based on the age
and sex of each Covered Person as actuarially determined by
the Network:
40. See, e.g., MARION MERRILL Dow, supra note 5; Marsha R. Gold et al., A National
Survey of the Arrangements Managed-Care Plans Make With Physicians, 333 N. ENG. J. MED.
1678 (1995).
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Age Male Female
_ _$__ __$__
_ _$__ __$__ _
_ _$__ __$__ _
_ _$__ __$__ _
_ _$__ __$__ _
_ _$ _ __$__ _
These capitation rates apply when the Covered Person's benefit
plan requires a $5.00 copayment for each office visit. In the
event that a different copayment amount applies, the capitation
rates may be adjusted by the Network 1
Different benefit plans also require different capitation
rates. In the HMO world, there are a relatively small number
of benefit plans. In the self-insured or collective bargaining
world, there often are dozens of different benefit plans. Indeed,
one of my clients had 275 different benefit plans! Furthermore,
it is rarely easy or inexpensive to change or consolidate benefit
plans, for example, changes may be subject to collective bar-
gaining.
Taxes are another example of the practical complexities
involved. What is the withhold taxable income to the provider?
Who keeps track of the thousands of "eighty/twenty" splits so
that accurate and timely Form 1099s can be issued? Who earns
interest on the withhold? When is it payable? Who makes sure
the interest is in a 1099?
In short, capitation is much more complicated for employ-
ers to administer than self-insured plans already in place and
operating.
M. Small Dollars: Who Cares?
Outside the few areas where HMOs are concentrated or
where there is a large payer, risk-sharing has a serious "who
cares?" problem. In many markets, no single payer accounts
for enough business to affect physician practice patterns. To
illustrate:
41. AM. ACAD. OF Hosp. AWY, MANAGED CARE HANDBOOK 53-83 (1993).
Physician Revenue by Payer
Percent of Revenue from Selected Sources, by Region, 199242
Medicare Blue Cross/ Other Third-
Raer Patients Medicaid Blue Shield Pa Paers
All Physicians 27 10 17 30 16
Northeast 28 9 20 27 17
North Central 27 10 19 30 14
South 27 10 17 29 18
West 24 10 15 35 17
Thus, in many markets no single payer matters enough for
withholds really to work and change physician behavior.
Moreover, physician services account for about twenty-
five percent of employee health plan costs. Thus, a twenty-
percent withhold of physician services at most puts at risk five
percent of total employee plan costs (twenty percent of twenty-
five percent). Who cares?
In summary, there is little or no capitated or risk-sharing
business actually in place today in self-insured plans, and little
if any reason for this to change much in the future.
V. THE MANAGED CARE REVOLUTION
A. Evolution
The "Growth in Managed Care" chart shows that health
benefits have been in the midst of the most important and
profound private market changes in history.
The 1980s were basically a decade when employers and
their benefit consultants tried to "fix" indemnity plans by im-
posing co-insurance and deductibles. For various reasons, these
"fixes" did not work. By the end of the decade, a new ap-
42. AM. MED. NEWs, Aug. 2, 1993, at21.
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proach was needed desperately because employee plan costs
returned to double-digit inflation.
In the early 1990s, employee plans and benefits consul-
tants made a paradigm shift to "managed care," a shift that has
been accelerating ever since. Rather than continuing to try to
"fix" indemnity plans, they shifted to using private incentives
for cost, quality, and performance with hospitals and other
providers - selective contracting with networks of providers.
With the paradigm shift to selective contracting networks, cost
reimbursement, Usual, Customary, and Reasonable (UCR), and
billed charge pricing in most cities is dead or dying as a practi-
cal matter. 3
The "Growth in Managed Care" graph shows that these
private market changes have occurred with breathtaking speed
and scope (it has continued apace since 1991 when the graph
stops). To illustrate, in the early 1990s I surveyed twelve major
Cleveland businesses that provide health benefits to 350,000
Clevelanders and 1.5 million people nationally. By 1992, all
had done something they had never done before - adopted
and were implementing some form of "managed care" plan and
were dropping traditional indemnity coverage.
B. Various Definitions of Managed Care
There is no legal, standard, or generally accepted defini-
tion of managed care. Instead, "managed care" encompasses all
of the following:'
1. Health Maintenance Organizations
HMOs are primarily state-regulated companies that, tradi-
tionally, combine insurance with a closed panel of providers.45
I-MOs are concentrated in a few states, with about half of
all HMO enrollees found in just five states:
43. See, e.g., Employee Health-Care Costs Decline, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 14, 1995,
at I-C (showing a 76% enrollment in managed care among large employers in northeast Ohio);
Employers Cut Health Costs in 1994, Shift to Managed Care, Survey Finds, 22 PENS. & BEN.
REP. (BNA), at 487 (Feb. 20, 1995) (showing a 63% enrollment in managed care nationally).
44. See, e.g., HIAA, SouRcE BoOK, supra note 17, at 21-51.
45. See generally MCADAMS Er AL, supra note 1.
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Five States With The Largest HMO Enrollment1
(In Hundred Thousands)
HMO Enrollment Cumulative
State NoN. -- o --
1. California 30,797 11,216 36% 11,216 23%
2. New York 17,886 4,656 26% 15,872 33%
3. Florida 13,915 2,549 18% 18,420 38%
4. Mass. 5,985 2,329 39% 20,750 43%
5. Texas 17,391 2,325 13% 23,074 47%
U.S. 251,987 48,782 19%
'Marion-Merrill-Dow, Managed Care Digest: HMO Edition. 1994, at 16-17.
The traditional HIMO benefit design was "all or nothing":
generous benefits if the patient used the closed panel of provid-
ers, no benefits if the patient did not. Financing was exclusive-
ly by premium, or "prepayment" in the HMO vernacular.
HMOs have changed dramatically over the last twenty
years. Originally, Kaiser was the model HMO - vertically
integrated companies which owned their own hospitals and em-
ployed their physicians.' Now only about forty percent of all
HMO enrollees, twenty million people, are in group or staff
model HMOs 7 Further, in reality, a significant amount of
HMO business is self-insured rather than prepaid.
It is customary, although not conceptually consistent or
discriminating, to count all enrollees of legally licensed HMOs
as HMO enrollees. That is, any person covered by an entity
licensed by a state as an HMO is counted as an HMO enrollee,
whether prepaid or self-insured, and whether having a group,
46. See, e.g., George Anders, In Age of the HMO, Pioneer of the Species Has Hit a Rough
Patch, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994, at Al; Ron Winslow, Employer Group Rethinks Commitment to
Big HMOs, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1995, at B1 (suggesting that Minneapolis, widely perceived as
the HMO model of the future, is moving away from HMOs and towards the provider joint
ventures that are emerging in the self-insured world around the country).
47. MAIoN MERRILL Dow, supra note 5, at 4.
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staff, network, or other arrangement with providers. Other than
the common legal bond of state licensure, HMOs vary widely
in what they do and how they operate. Using the legal defini-
tion of an HMO under state law, there are about fifty million
people enrolled in HMOs.
As a practical matter, HMO enrollment is significantly less
than fifty million in two ways. First, a significant number of
HMO enrollees are self-insured, not prepaid. They should be
counted not as HMO enrollees, but as self-insured network
enrollees. For example, the 400,000 covered lives in the Min-
neapolis business coalition plan are self-insured, not prepaid -
even though the provider networks and administration are
provided by companies also licensed as HMOs.' Second,
group and staff model HMOs historically and conceptually are
the true HMOs. Group and staff model HMOs, however, only
cover twenty million people. The IPA and other models cover
thirty million people, but are not HMOs in a conceptual and
traditional sense of the term.
2. Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs)
Preferred Provider Organizations were a major benefit
innovation introduced in the early 1980s. Unlike HMOs, there
are two levels of benefits in a PPO: a higher level when "pre-
ferred providers" or provider networks are used, and a lower
level if other providers are used. PPOs are generally not regu-
lated by the states, and were pioneered by self-insured plans
unencumbered by inflexible HMO laws.
From an antitrust perspective, outside the few areas where
HMOs have large enrollments, PPOs and their network succes-
sors were, and are, the principal engine of private reform be-
cause of their selective contracting with providers. Financing is
predominantly self-insured, but also may be insured.
3. Point-of-Service Plans
These are PPOs in HMO legal clothing, i.e., they are
48. Interview with Fred Hamacher, Dayton Hudson Corp., in Phoenix, Arizona (May 14,
1996).
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HMOs that offer a PPO-type two-tier benefit, so that patients
at the "point-of-service" can go outside the HMO's closed pan-
el.
4. Gatekeeper Plans
Usually HMOs, these plans require patients to use a "gate-
keeper" physician who must authorize referrals to other doc-
tors, hospitals, and for other services.
5. Managed Indemnity
Traditional indemnity plans allow free choice of doctor
and hospital, regardless of cost, and require that hospital ad-
missions and certain other services be pre-certified or "man-
aged." "Managed Indemnity" plans are not network plans as
the term is used here, since they do not selectively contract
with or provide incentives to use a network of providers.
6. Self-Insured ERISA Networks
Self-insured ERISA networks are defined here to be any
health benefit program that is: (1) self-insured; (2) subject to
ERISA; and (3) uses provider networks.
Networks are defined to be any arrangement between
payers and providers that meets Judge Michael J. Melloy's test,
that is, generates price as well as other forms of competition at
the provider level.49 As Judge Melloy decisively stated in
Mercy Health, "[provider price] competition has occurred be-
cause of the arrival of managed care." PPOs and HMOs, which
selectively contract with, own, or employ a limited panel of
providers, are the classic examples of networks. Judge Melloy's
Antitrust 101 point is often overlooked, but it is fundamental to
antitrust law and to a market economy. In the words of the
U.S. Supreme Court in a famous antitrust opinion, price is the
"central nervous system of the economy."' Indeed, price
competition is so important to a private market economy that it
is a felony under federal and many state antitrust laws for
competitors to "fix prices" by agreeing on price for the express
49. United States v. Mercy Health Serv., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
50. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,226 n.59 (1940).
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purpose of reducing or eliminating price competition'
VI. EXPLORING THE TWO ROADS
OF MANAGED CARE
The Article at the outset explored a few of the implica-
tions of managed care's moving on two roads - a prepaid road
and a self-insured road: one road represented by HMOs, the
other by self-insured ERISA networks. Two implications were
explored. The first is, no premiums/no capitation. If there are
no premiums, where is the cash to pay capitation? The second
is, more regulation/more self-insurance. That is, the more state
regulators and legislatures try to regulate managed care, the
more incentives they create for employee plans to become or
stay self-insured ERISA networks to avoid government regula-
tion.
This section explores some of the other features of the
"two roads" of managed care.
A. Private Versus Government Reform
For those who believe private markets responsive to con-
sumers (patients) are superior to government command-and-
control regulation, this is the best of times. For people of this
world view, the superiority of private markets over government
regulation is not a shock, it is simply to be expected.52 At
bottom, they have a revolutionary view: let the patient, not the
government, decide.
For regulatory advocates, however, who believe that pri-
vate markets and health care are oxymoronic, and that massive
doses of state and federal regulation are "best" for patients,53
51. One of the interesting differences between antitrust policy and some health policy
analysts concerns "discount PPOs." Since discount PPOs generate provider price competition,
antitrust policy considers them to be an extremely important development. In some health policy
circles, discount PPOs are given little, if any, importance.
52. See BREYER, REGULATON, supra note 4; see also ScHuLmE, supra note 4.
53. Rationing is perhaps the most extreme example. It involves "Grand Poobahs of Life
and Death" deciding who lives and who dies - even though medical science is ever changing and
often uncertain, and market forces are now often reducing costs. Rationing has long been a reality
for the poor in some states. For many regulatory types, it is the only "rational" option for the fu-
ture for all of us. See, e.g., Marilyn Chase, New Prescription: Rationed Health Care Helps
Oregon's Poor But Real Test is Ahead, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22,1994, at Al.
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this is the worst of times. Today, they are either in denial,
baffled by the stunning speed and success of private innovation
in health care, or both. Indeed, like those who believed the
world was flat, many are confident that private market innova-
tion will soon fall off the edge of the earth.
B. The Challenges for the Next Generation of Managed Care
Health care is now poised to move beyond the "Model T"
stage of managed care to the next generation. At the outset, the
next generation is likely to be known by a more patient-friend-
ly phrase than "managed care," perhaps "patient choice." There
are many complex issues attendant to it.
The opportunities for the next generation of managed care
are substantial, since health care has not yet solved the Blind
Man and the Elephant riddle, nor mastered the Heisenberg
Uncertainty Principle of Health Care, nor developed the ap-
propriate financial incentives that reward providers for excel-
lence without rewarding underservice or overservice. These
subjects are discussed next.
C. The Blind Man and the Elephant
Health care in most cities suffers from the Blind Man and
the Elephant problem. Doctors, hospitals, and other providers
have practiced separately and independently for so long they
see only their part of the elephant. Most providers do not, and
cannot see the whole elephant, for claims processing, computer
system differences, and other reasons. Even when providers
and others want to collaborate, there is a babble of incompati-
ble computer systems in doctors' offices, hospitals, employee
health plans, and carriers, as well as antitrust risks that add to
the complexity. There should be much opportunity for those
who can remove the blinders.
D. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle of Health Care
Health care, like quantum physics, often is counterintui-
tive. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle of Health Care
holds that low unit prices may result in higher total costs, and
higher unit prices may lead to lower total costs and better
[Vol. 6:305
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quality.
For example, a doctor may agree to a ten-percent discount
and charge $900 for a procedure in an area where the average
fee is $1000, but may employ the procedure three times more
frequently than other doctors. As a result, the total physician
cost will be $2700, versus $1000, and the total cost, including
hospital and other services, even higher, despite a ten-percent
discount on the physician's unit price.
1. Practice Variations and Scientific Uncertainty
Most people assume that there is a standard medical care
treatment for any condition, based on scientific and proven
treatments. For much of medicine, however, there are substan-
tial and legitimate differences of opinion regarding treatment of
a condition within the health professions. Often there simply
is no scientific basis for distinguishing between risk, cost, and
results. As a result, there are wide variations in the quantity or
utilization of health care services delivered for comparable
patients. As noted earlier, total costs can vary more than one
hundred percent, depending on where people live.
Dr. John Wennberg of Dartmouth Medical School pio-
neered the study of these variations. Dr. Wennberg found, for
example, that "[b]y the time women reach seventy years of age
in one hospital market the likelihood they have undergone a
hysterectomy is twenty percent, while in another market it is
seventy percent."54 That is, the variation in hysterectomy rates
is more than 3.5 to one. Similarly, for men who reach age
eighty-five, the percentage who have undergone prostatectomy
ranges from fifteen to sixty percent, depending on where they
live.55
These wide variations are not limited to hysterectomy and
54. John E. Wennberg, Dealing With Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action,
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6, 9 [hereinafter Wennberg, Dealing with Variations]. See also
WENNBERG ET AL., DARTMoUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES (1996); Philip
Caper, Variations in Medical Practice: Implications for Health Policy, HEALTH AFF., Summer
1984, at 110; David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, HEALTH
AF., Summer 1984, at 74; Howard H. Hiatt, Will Your Next Hospital Stay Be Necessary?, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 18, 1986, at 36; John E. Wermberg, Improving The Medical Decision-Making
Process, HEALTH APF., Spring 1988, at 99 [hereinafter Wennberg, Decision-Making Process].
55. Wermberg, Decision-Making Process, supra note 54.
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prostatectomy procedures. Dr. Wennberg found that "more than
85 percent of hospitalizations... appear to have greater varia-
tion in per capita use rates among hospital market areas than
hysterectomy .... ."
These variations in medical opinions and treatment pat-
terns also exist internationally. 7
Number of Admissions Per 1,000 Population
Coronary Bypass Hysterectomy Prostatectomy
United States 61 557 308
Canada 26 479 229
Japan 1 90 -
United Kingdom 6 144 144
Utilization, not unit pricing, is probably the most impor-
tant challenge and opportunity for the next generation of man-
aged care. The realities are that there are wide variations in
utilization and professional judgment or practice patterns, as
well as scientific uncertainty and legitimate differences of
opinion on the efficacy of many treatments, and much is in
flux. Utilization is far more intractable than unit price.
For example, a number of employers recently have ad-
vised me that according to their actuaries, their admissions per
thousand patients should be sixty, but actually are more than
twice that, 140 per 1000. They have tried insurance carriers,
TPAs, and Utilization Review firms for years to manage utili-
zation, but it is not working. Now, they want to try letting the
people who treat patients, rather than a distant third-party com-
puter program, nurse, or doctor try to manage cost and utiliza-
tion.
56. Wennberg, Dealing with Variations, supra note 54, at 15.
57. Klim McPherson, International Differences in Medical Care Practices, HEALTH CARE
IN. RE V., Supp. 1989, at 9, 14.
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2. Variation by Location
The $4000 average annual cost for employee health plans,
however, is a true average. It varies substantially by age, loca-
tion, and other factors.
As to location, total costs can vary more than one hundred
percent depending on where people live:58
Differences in the Total Cost of
Group Health Plans by Location
Cy Factor
Los Angeles 1.73
Miami 1.70
New York 1.39
San Francisco 1.34
New Orleans 1.23
Detroit 1.18
Philadelphia 1.16
Phoenix 1.10
Cleveland 1.08
Newark 1.07
Atlanta 1.06
Pittsburgh 1.02
St. Louis .99
Denver .95
Nashville .95
El Paso .89
Minneapolis .88
Seattle .85
Columbus .84
Buffalo .75
U.S. Average 1.00
Similarly, Medicare costs varied from $2100 a person per year
in one county to $7800 annually in the highest-cost county-a
difference of nearly four hundred percent! 9
58. Miliman & Robertson actuarial data, cited in U.S. GEN. Accr. OFFICE, EMPLOYER-
BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 53 (Sept. 1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT, INSURANCE].
59. See, e.g., AAPCCRatebook, MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 143,604 (Sept. 7,
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3. Variation by Age
Total costs also vary substantially by age. There is, for
example, a "4-to-2-to-1" rule of thumb for employee health
plans: early retirees under age sixty-five (before Medicare
eligibility) cost four times as much as persons over sixty-five
(after Medicare eligibility), and twice as much as active em-
ployees.
The 4-to-2-to-1 Rule of Thumb
Employee Health Plans
Sement Relative Cost
" Regular Retirees (over 65)
(Medicare Supplement) I
" Active Employees 2
" Early Retirees (under 65) 4
4. Variation of Unit Prices
Total costs also often vary because of the wide variation
in the unit prices charged for hospital and other services. The
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council has illus-
trative data on this phenomenon.' The following example
shows that hospital prices varied by more than one hundred
percent for the repair or replacement of a heart valve-with no
correlation as to quality as measured by morbidity or mortality.
1995). Similarly, Medicare costs for treating comparable patients vary from 21% below the
national average in Rochester, Minnesota, the home of the Mayo Clinic, to 66% above the
national average in Miami. Walter McClure & Dale Shaller, Variations in Medicare Expenditures
Per Elder, HEALT AFF., Summer 1984, at 120, 122.
60. Ron Winslow, Data Spur Debate on Hospital Quality, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1990, at
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Repair Or Replacement Of Heart Valves With
Pump and Cardiac Catheterization
Number of Patients Number of Patients
Average Who Died with ComplicationsHospital Char e Observed Eected Observed Expected
Allegheny General Hosp. $95,185 5 1.22 3 2.37
Presbyterian-University 73,209 4 1.30 2 2.36
St. Francis Medical Ctr. 66,993 1 0.40 2 0.65
Montefiore Hospital Assoc. 61,382 0 0.11 0 0.20
Shadyside Hosp. 51,809 1 1.60 0 2.78
Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh 48,559 1 2.08 4 1.89
West Penn Hosp. 44,959 1 0.91 3 1.50
Similarly, there should be much opportunity for those who
understand and can master the Heisenberg Uncertainty Princi-
ple of Health Care.
E. New Provider Incentives
There are very important and difficult incentive system
complexities: How do you reward cost and quality perfor-
mance among thousands of independent businesses and solve
the classic health care paradox of rewarding excellence, with-
out rewarding either underservice or overservice?6"
Judge Posner recently described the financial incentives
for underservice in the HMO and capitated context: "The
HMO's incentive is to keep you healthy if it can, but if you
get very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a healthy state
involving few medical expenses, to let you die as quickly and
61. See, e.g., Cover Story; The Soul of an HMO, Tam, Jan. 22,1996, at 44. See also MARc
A. RODWiN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MoRALs: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTs OF INTEREsT (1993).
GEORGE CRLnE, SURGERY 115-25 (1978) (stating that fee-for-service medicine creates a triple
conflict of interest for surgeons).
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cheaply as possible."62
Dr. Arnold Relman, retired editor of the prestigious New
England Journal of Medicine, has pointed out that there can be
inappropriate financial incentives that lead to overservice:
[Flee-for-service is piecework reimbursement and, like any
piecework system, it provides powerful economic incentives to
increase output - that is, to increase the number of services
provided by physicians .... [The fee-for-service arrangement
creates a conflict of interest for the physician. Although doctors
are supposed to be agents and trustees for their patients, the
economic rewards of fee-for-service provide incentives for them
to recommend services that may not be necessary or cost effec-
tive.63
Properly aligning provider financial incentives with health
care excellence will be one of the most important tasks and
contributions of the next generation of managed care.
F. Contract Versus Ownership Integration
Today, health care is like many other technology-driven
fields. Contract integration, not ownership integration, is the
natural way most cutting-edge business is being conducted. In
the words of Peter Drucker, the "dean" of American
mangement consultants, "the greatest change in corporate struc-
ture, and in the way business is being conducted, may be the
largely unreported growth of relationships that are not based on
ownership but on partnership."
Drucker points out that in the 1950s the conventional
wisdom was that by 1990 almost everyone would work for a
big organization. "They were wrong," Drucker states bluntly.65
In short, Drucker sees the winners in the future as businesses
that are masters of the "Network Society" of contract integra-
62. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410 (7th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1288 (1996).
63. Arnold Relman, Cost Control, Doctors' Ethics, and Patient Care, IssuEs IN ScI. &
TECH., 1985, at 103, 106.
64. PETER DRUCKER, MANAGING IN A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE 69 (1995) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter DRUCKER, MANAGING].
65. Peter Drucker, The Network Society, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29,1995, at A14. See generally
id.; PETER DRUCKER, THE AGE OF DIscoNTINurry (1968).
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tion, not businesses locked-into the 1950's industrial model of
vertical and horizontal ownership integration.'
In health care, well-known consultant Jeff Goldsmith came
to the same conclusion. He points out that in 1980 many ex-
perts predicted that the industrial model of vertical and hori-
zontal ownership integration would prevail in health care. He
now abandons that view, and agrees with Mr. Drucker.
The core flaw in the integration movement in healthcare is the
use of an obsolete, 19th-century, asset-based model of integra-
tion, in which accumulation of assets in a conglomerate style is
assumed by itself to confer meaningful economic advantage.67
Another recent health care article, this one specifically on
California's experience, also confirms Drucker's point that
ownership integration generally should be the last choice, not
the first choice of health care innovators:'
The legal and economic literature on firms and markets thus
tends to view vertical integration as the governance mechanism
of last resort, to be used only when market and contractual rela-
tionships are not feasible. This contrasts with the conventional
wisdom in health services research, which apparently considers
vertical integration as the governance mechanism of first resort
under managed care.
** *
[There will be considerably more contractual relationships and
considerably less vertical integration than predicted by some
advocates of hospital-centered delivery systems.
Similarly, it has been reported recently that it is expensive for
hospitals to acquire physician practices, but difficult to make
these high-cost investments profitable.69
The substance underneath emerging post-"Model T" man-
aged care includes addressing the unique facts and features of
66. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANICPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPEITON
PoLIcY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, ch. 10, Joint Ventures (May 1996).
67. The Illusive Logic ofIntegration, HEALTHCARE F., Sept. 1994, at 26,28.
68. James C. Robinson & Lawrence P. Casalino, Vertical Integration and Organizational
Networks in Health Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1996, at 8, 20, 21.
69. Practices Sell, Hospitals Lose, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 11, 1995, at 1.
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health care, which may require and benefit from new forms of
collaboration by small businesses, including physicians.
Total cost, not unit prices, is now the key to cost perfor-
mance in health care. Yet most doctors' and hospitals are
separate and often small businesses that have never collaborat-
ed among themselves or together to manage total costs and
quality like typical businesses. As Judge Posner recently stated,
"[p]hysicians practice in groups, in alliances, in networks,
utilizing expensive equipment and support .... [Otherwise
they] would be competing to provide horse-and-buggy medi-
cine.""
Indeed, the next generation of managed care may be like
other high technology organizations with a network of contrac-
tual rather than ownership relationships, for example, like Intel
making computer chips:
The manufacturing discipline extends beyond the Intel factories.
Equipment suppliers vying for orders from Intel are subject to
painstaking scrutiny. Producers of chip-etching machines or
furnaces, for example, will be put through runoffs judged by
Intel that last months. One equipment maker will be chosen to
supply Intel factories worldwide, reducing the chances of varia-
tion from one factory to the next. Because chip making is so
precise, any variation is anathema, potentially reducing
yields.72
Once selected, the supplier will be subject to even closer moni-
toring from Intel. It demands to know whether equipment
makers want to use different subcontractors, even for screws
and bolts, because any change could affect the manufacturing
process slightly.
G. Antitrust Reliefa3
70. Remarkably, about two-thirds of the approximately 570,000 practicing physicians in
the United States are either solo practitioners or in practice with only one other physician. AM.
MED. ASS'N, MEDIcAL GROUPS IN THE U.S., 1993, at 43-44.
71. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406,1412 (7th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1288 (1996).
72. Steve Lohr, Suiting Upfor America's High Tech Future, N.Y. Tams, Dec. 5, 1995, at
Fl, F14.
73. See generally Charles D. Weller, Antitrust and Health Care at the Crossroads:
Dangers and Opportunities (Nov. 1995 paper submitted to FrC Hearings) and Clark C.
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Unfortunately, current federal antitrust policy is focused
on "capitation," providers taking "substantial financial risk,"
and Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,74 with the
result that an unnecessarily restrictive and actually
anticompetitive antitrust approach is being applied to self-in-
sured ERISA network plans and other settings where capitation
is not being used or is unrealistic.' As happened with joint
ventures several years ago, "uncertainties in enforcement policy
have almost certainly blocked, delayed, or raised the cost of
legitimate undertakings," '76 for self-insured networks and simi-
lar plans.
It is also reminiscent of the cooperative price advertising
disagreement between the Antitrust Division and the FTC in
the early 1960s. The FTC took the position in an advisory
opinion that joint price advertising was a per se violation,
while the Justice Department's Antitrust Division disagreed.
Specifically, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division wrote Senator Humphrey on April 19, 1963:
It is our opinion that the action of a group of small retail busi-
ness concerns in publishing cooperative advertising containing
selling prices does not in and of itself constitute a violation of
the Sherman Act 7
Perhaps federal antitrust enforcers do not realize how
successful they have been, and how much antitrust enforcement
has contributed to the present private health care revolution.
Perhaps they have been in battle so long and so hard that they
Havighurst, Are the Antitrust Agencies Overregulating Physician Networks?, 8 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REP. 78 (1995-96).
74. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
75. For example, "pure" messenger models recently have been prescribed as a federal
antitrust cure for provider network "price-fixing." The commonly used "modified" messenger
model has not been so fortunate, hence it might be called the "impure" messenger model. In the
real world, both models ae totally impractical, very expensive, unnecessary, and are actually
anticompetitive. To borrow a phrase, they are to competition in health care as military music is to
music.
76. Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L. J.
1605 (1986).
77. See SELEcT COMM. ON SMALL Bus., FTC ADVISORY OPINION ON JOINT ADS, H. R.
Rep. No. 699, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-32 (1963). See also Recent Developments, Cooperative
Advertising and the Per Se Rule 16 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (1964) (discussing why the Rule of
Reason applies).
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have not had time to enjoy the fruits of victory. Or perhaps
they, like many others, are victims of delayed reporting that
has published little on self-insured networks, where there are
generally no premiums and thus no capitation, but much on
HMOs, where there are premiums and a long history of capita-
tion and other forms of risk-sharing.
Whatever the reason, the dangers of current federal anti-
trust policy include the following.
First, it unnecessarily deprives the public of the full bene-
fits of competition and innovation leading to the next genera-
tion of managed care, including full competition by provider
networks to serve self-insured employee plans.
Second, it favors certain competitors over others (insurers,
HMOs, and other third parties over doctors, hospitals, and oth-
er providers who actually treat patients, and ownership integra-
tion over contract integration). Antitrust policy should be neu-
tral, so that the public can benefit from all forms of competi-
tion and the public, not government, makes the choices.
Third, with all due respect, the government will lose.7" It
is, of course, not good antitrust policy for the government to
lose. Practically speaking, public and private antitrust plaintiffs
who resort to the temptation of mechanistic antitrust, where
anticompetitive effects are presumed rather than proven, gener-
ally lose.79 Under the facts facing health care today and
mainstream antitrust law,' bona fide physician, hospital, and
other joint ventures that add value and have real customers will
win.
78. Two recent examples of the government losing are United States v. Mercy Health
Serv., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (denying injunction) and FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 1995-
1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 171,037 (W.D. Mo.), affd, 69 F.3d 260 (11th Cir. 1995) (denying
preliminary injunction). Two landmark previous examples are United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) and United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
79. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990), is perhaps the most
important example, since two sitting Justices of the Supreme Court (Thomas and Ginsburg) joined
in an opinion that handed the government a stunning loss in this merger case. See also United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp.
621,688 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992).
80. As Robert Pitofsky has observed, antitrust law is "all but unanimous that per se rules
are inappropriate for joint venture analysis," that "[u]nlike cartels, joint ventures are devices that
frequently achieve legitimate business advantages," with the result "that joint ventures in the
United States generally have been treated leniently." Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 76, at
1605, 1606, 1621 (footnote omitted).
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At the same time, there are great opportunities for federal
antitrust policy, particularly now. Federal antitrust policy need
only do the following.
1. Include Self-Insured Plans. Broaden the focus beyond
capitation and risk-sharing to include self-insured network
plans that have no premiums, no capitation, and no risk-shar-
ing.
2. Return Health Care to the Antitrust Mainstream. Apply
the same antitrust law used for other sectors of the economy to
health care. FTC Commissioner Azcuenaga presented her views
on "Integrated Joint Ventures," noting that capitation and risk-
sharing were rather unique to the health care field and indi-
cating that a simpler and more pragmatic approach to joint
ventures was appropriate:
Instead of attempting to transplant the emphasis on capita-
tion and risk-sharing from the market for physician services to
other markets, it may be more useful to examine the market
context in which the venture is being formed, including the
likely market power of the venture. Although financial risk-
sharing can be a key feature of an integrated joint venture, it
may be easier in evaluating a joint venture in a new market
simply to ask the more general questions posed by Judge Taft
in Addyston Pipe or to explore as a matter of common sense
whether the venture is reasonable for some purpose other than
restricting competition. In short, I would warn against spending
too much time examining the mechanics of how a joint venture
is integrated and too little time considering the efficiency as-
pects of the venture and its significance to competition given
the particular circumstances in which the venture is formed.'
There is no reason to treat health care any differently.
3. Retire Maricopa. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medi-
cal Society, a case from the horse-and-buggy era of health care,
is being applied far beyond its legal, factual, and policy under-
pinnings. Meanwhile, 100 years of mainstream antitrust law, as
well as current health care market realities, often are being
ignored.
Mainstream antitrust law includes Maricopa, but is much
richer and not limited to it. As Mr. Pitofsky has explained,
81. Mary L. Azcuenaga, Joint Ventures - Finding the Safety Zone, Remarks at the
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust and Section of Business Law, (Aug. 7, 1995), at 6.
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Maricopa involved "little or no integration, no real improve-
ment in the functioning of the market, and no increase in firm
or group efficiency.""2
The U. S. Supreme Court recently reemphasized, a decade
after Maricopa, that "actual market realities," not "formalistic
distinctions," generally are controlling in antitrust law. 3 In
Professor Areeda's blunt terms about such joint sales agencies,
"no one believes that they violate the per se rule against 'price
fixing.'
' 84
The public would benefit, the times require, and main-
stream antitrust law and policy fully support retiring Maricopa
as the sole source of federal antitrust policy on provider net-
works before it further disables the private revolution under
way in health care.
4. Abandon Mechanistic Antitrust Law. Heed the advice of
the Supreme Court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS (BMI) that
"price-fixing" "is not a question simply of determining whether
two or more potential competitors have literally 'fixed' a
'price,"' and that "[1]iteralness is overly simplistic:""5
[The blanket license involves "price fixing" in the literal sense:
the composers and publishing houses have joined together into
an organization that sets its price for the blanket license it sells.
But this is not a question simply of determining whether two or
more potential competitors have literally "fixed" a "price ...."
The Court of Appeals' literal approach does not alone establish
that this particular practice is one of those types or that it is
"plainly anti-competitive" and very likely without "redeeming
virtue." Literalness is overly simplistic and often overbroad."
5. Apply Antitrust Joint Venture-Market Power Law. Ap-
ply another area of mainstream antitrust law used for many
sectors of the economy for many years, to the collaborations
among providers and others in the health care field where there
82. Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 76, at 1617.
83. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
84. PHILUP E. AREEDA, 7 ANTrrRusT LAW, 1 1510, at 422 (1986) (footnote omitted).
Accord L. SULLIVAN, ANTrrRUST 206-08 (1977); National Bank Card Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,
779 F.2d 592 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (holding per se price-fixing rule did not apply to Visa, a horizontal
joint venture, when it fixed an interchange fee and was lawful under the Rule of Reason).
85. Broadcast Music v. CBS (BMI), 441 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1979).
86. Id.
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are many independent professionals and entities. Mainstream
antitrust in general, and joint venture-market power law in
particular, provide sound bases for encouraging the collabo-
rations that benefit the public, while preventing those that do
not.
Health care is predominantly served by tens of thousands
of independent, and proud, institutions and individuals, includ-
ing doctors, hospitals, insurance companies, HMOs, PPOs,
computer companies, and utilization review companies. Many
are small businesses. Some will merge, but others will want to
try to collaborate on some things, remain independent for oth-
ers, and change over time. For the reasons detailed next, most
provider collaborations will not have market power in the
antitrust sense.
Mainstream antitrust joint venture law provides a sound
legal and policy basis for federal antitrust policy and collabora-
tions by doctors, hospitals, and others. Robert Pitofsky summa-
rized mainstream joint venture law 7 in his opinion for the
Commission in In re Brunswick:.
The joint venture is in some respects a "quasi-merger," where
cooperation between formerly independent companies often acts
to benefit and spur competition. The combined capital, assets or
know-how of two companies may facilitate entry into new mar-
kets and thereby enhance competition, or may create efficien-
cies or new productive capacity unachievable by either alone.
As a result, relatively lenient merger standards usually apply to
joint ventures, rather than straight per se rules that may apply to
cartel behavior.U
There are two basic issues under joint venture-market power
law. First, is this a bona fide joint venture, or after careful
87. Accord Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)
("[J]oint ventures.., hold the promise of increasing a firm's efficiency and enabling it to compete
more effectively. Accordingly, such combinations are judged under a rule of reason, an inquiry
into market power and market structure designed to assess the combination's actual effect.")
88. In Re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1253, 1265-66 (1979), affd in relevant part sub
nom, Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915
(1982) (footnotes omitted). See also Pitofsky, Framework, supra note 76; Robert Pitofsky, Joint
Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1007 (1969); Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement
in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L. J. 195 (1992) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Proposals]; and Charles D.
Weller, Antitrust Aspects of PPOs, in DALE H. COWAN, PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS
(1984).
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review, a cartel? Second, do the parties have market power in
the antitrust sense of the term?
6. Measure Market Power Under Today's Realities. Apply
mainstream antitrust market power law to today's realities in
the health care field. Today's market realities are that providers
generally cannot obtain and maintain market power, and pro-
vider market shares generally will not translate into market
power, for at least three reasons:
(a) People. People (professionals) are probably the most impor-
tant resource for the next generation of managed care, and
people, unlike plant and equipment in industrial markets, are
legally and practically highly mobile;"
(b) Excess Capacity. There is considerable excess capacity in
the health care field in terms of both facilities and profession-
als;' and
(c) Managed Care. The prevalence of managed care in most
markets means that payers need not and will not accept
anticompetitive arrangements.
A helpful analysis of today's market realitites in over
3400 small geographic areas and 306 larger referral areas now
is available, coincidentally and fortuitously. The Dartmouth
Atlas of Health Care in the United States (1996), written by a
team led by John E. Wennberg, M.D., M.P.H., of Dartmouth
Medical School, shows the geographic distribution of hospital,
physician, and other health-care resources in the United States
in 3436 geographic "hospital service areas" and 306 "hospital
referral regions."
It is basic antitrust law that market share does not auto-
matically mean market power. Since provider market power
will be rare or can be remedied easily, mainstream antitrust
joint venture law provides strong support for encouraging bona
fide joint ventures among providers and others to try to solve
the many challenges facing the next generation of managed
89. See, e.g., DONALD J. ASPELUND & CLARENCE E. ERIKSEN, EMPLOYEE
NONCOMPETITION LAW (1995).
90. See, e.g., Are DoctorsA Dime A Dozen?, HosP. & HEALTH NETwoRKs, Nov. 20, 1995,
at 15 (discussing New Foundation study); Bill Richards, Hold The Phone, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
1996, at Al (showing telemedicine broadens the geographic scope of physician practices).
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care, without unnecessary antitrust impediments or risks.
7. Low Entry Barriers/Service Shifting. Under mainstream
antitrust merger law, there are a number of methods of deter-
mining whether market power concerns can be extended to
joint ventures. Mr. Pitofsky has summarized some of the appli-
cable merger law as follows:9'
Consistent with present enforcement agency guidelines and
court decisions, mergers above the threshold levels would nev-
ertheless be permitted where barriers to entry into the market
were exceptionally low, where dominant firm behavior and
coordinated interaction among firms left in the market is not
feasible (for example, because products are extremely heteroge-
neous, making dominant firm or cartel behavior difficult to
implement), or where similar products sold in other markets, or
slightly different products, could easily be shifted into the
merged firms' market if prices were to increase.
This suggests that three factors be applied to health care
joint ventures, so that if any one of the three is present, the
joint venture participants would know there is no antitrust
market power concern:
(a) barriers to entry are exceptionally low, or
(b) dominant firm behavior and coordinated interaction is not
feasible, or
(c) similar services easily can be shifted if prices increase.
8. No Purpose Except Stifling Competition. It would be
extremely helpful and procompetitive in'these rapidly changing
times to clarify when joint efforts by providers and others will
be deemed joint ventures and thus outside the per se rule. To
illustrate, the Department of Justice includes a mainstream
antitrust definition of joint ventures:
A joint venture is essentially any collaborative effort among
firms, short of a merger, with respect to R&D, production, dis-
tribution, and/or the marketing of products or services. For ex-
ample, joint ventures may be created to take advantage of com-
plimentary skills or economies of skill and production, market-
ing, or R&D, or to spread risk.'
91. Pitofsky, Proposals, supra note 88, at 201 (footnote omitted).
92. U.S. DEP'T OF JusT., ANTRusT GuIDELImNs FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 41
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Further, the case law suggests that a general rule applies,
borrowing words from the U.S. Supreme Court: Joint ventures
like any other collaborative activity are judged under the Rule
of Reason and not under the per se rule unless they have "no
purpose except stifling of competition."'93
9. Make Risk-Sharing Optional, Not Necessary. As noted,
federal antitrust policy at present is limited to capitation and
risk-sharing for innovative providers to best avoid the per se
rule, but is at best silent on market realities in most of the
United States where there is little or no risk-sharing.
Once again, mainstream antitrust law can be used. The
Supreme Court repeatedly has made it clear that risk-sharing is
not a necessary element to avoid the per se rule (even though a
price agreement by virtually 100% of the sellers and no risk-
sharing was involved).94
The Antitrust Division also has made it clear outside
health care that risk-sharing is one, but not the only, way of
avoiding the per se rule in other settings. For example, the
Department of Justice expressly lists risk-sharing as one of
several alternative reasons for legitimate joint ventures. "[J]oint
ventures may be created to take advantage of complimentary
skills or economies of scale and production, marketing, or
R&D, or to spread risk."' There is no reason not to apply the
same rules to health care.
In summary, risk-sharing should be optional, but not a
requisite, for bona fide joint venture status.
10. The "Real Customers" Rule. As a practical antitrust
matter, as the 1993 Guidelines point out, it is "significant" if
real customers request the joint action involved.'
Accordingly, a "Real Customers" Rule should be used as
(Nov. 1988).
93. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS (BMI), 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (BMI) (quoting White Mo-
tor) (emphasis added).
94. Id. See also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,280 (6th Cir. 1898),
affid, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (cited favorably in BMI, at 9).
95. ANTITRUST GUmELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, supra note 92, at 41
(November 1988) (emphasis added).
96. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT" OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COmm'N, STATEMENTS OF ANTrrRusT
ENFORCEMENT PoUcY IN THE HEALTH CARE AREA 45 (Sept. 15, 1993).
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one way to establish that a bona fide joint venture is involved.
If at least one actual or prospective customer, such as an insur-
er, employer, health and welfare fund, HMO, or TPA, requests
the joint activity, that should be sufficient proof that a bona
fide joint venture is involved.
This simple, practical rule will have another salutary effect
beyond reducing needless antitrust barriers to innovation.
Health care, like any field undergoing turbulent change, has
many interesting ideas for which there are no real customers
today and no real prospects for the future. The "Real Custom-
ers" Rule also would lower health care costs and speed up
innovation by focusing collaborative action on what employee
health plans and other customers will buy.
11. One Hundred Percent Market Share With No
Exclusives. The 1994 Guidelines use a twenty-percent market
share limit for exclusive networks and a thirty-percent limit for
nonexclusives. This is overly cautious in today's market and
under established law. Most important, patients often prefer a
wide choice of doctors and other providers. As a result, limit-
ing patient choice to twenty or thirty percent of providers often
will seriously reduce market appeal and likely success in the
market, particularly in Type II managed care markets where
self-insured network plans prevail.
Mainstream antitrust law and the new market realities in
most of the United States permit and encourage provider joint
ventures that even include all providers when they are non-
exclusive. The Supreme Court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS,97 with essentially 100% of the sellers involved, cited
nonexclusivity in holding there was no per se price-fixing
involved.
Finally, the facts in all or most of the United States are
similar to one of the examples in the 1994 Guidelines that
involved a joint venture with a large percentage of providers.
Given those facts, the 1994 Guidelines concluded that
anticompetitive effects were unlikely:
Although the joint venture has a relatively large market share of
some specialties, it appears unlikely to present competitive con-
cerns under the rule of reason because of three factors: (1) the
97. 441 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).
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demonstrated ability of health benefits plans to contract with
physicians individually; (2) the possibility that other physician
network joint ventures could be formed; and (3) the potential
benefits from the coverage to be provided by this physician net-
work joint venture. Therefore, the Agencies would not chal-
lenge the joint venture.98
In summary, health care joint ventures should be allowed
to experiment with up to 100% of providers, so long as the
provider arrangements, in practice, are not exclusive.
12. Limit Oligopoly Price-Exchange Rules To Oligopolies.
A number of federal antitrust policy pronouncements apply oli-
gopoly confidentiality rules to nonoligopolistic provider mar-
kets.
As a matter of antitrust law, rules limiting the exchange of
pricing information by competitors were developed for
oligopolistic markets. Most physicians and other providers,
however, are in markets where there are many, rather than a
few, competitors.
As a practical matter, it is very difficult if not impossible
to be innovative and quickly respond to prospective customers
in fast changing markets without access to all relevant informa-
tion among independent providers, including unit prices and
total costs. Health care consumers, providers, and payers would
be greatly assisted by eliminating overly restrictive, impractical
and unnecessary price confidentiality policies in most locations.
Again, given the shift to selective contracting in most of
the United States, there is little competitive risk to allowing
price exchanges among joint venturers and other collaborators.
As the 1994 Guidelines point out, "any attempt by the joint
venture's participants collectively to increase the price of phy-
sician [or other provider] services above competitive levels
would likely lead third-party payers to recruit" providers else-
where.99
Thus, federal antitrust policy should eliminate overly re-
strictive and impractical confidentiality requirements for health
care providers, except in oligopoly provider markets.
98. U.S. DEP'r OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ENFORCEMENT PoucY
AND ANALYInCAL PRiCipLES RELATiNG TO HEALTH CARE AND ANTrrRUST 81 (Sept. 27,1994).
99. Id. at 77.
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13. Provide Criminal Antitrust Guidance. The Department
of Justice has both criminal and civil antitrust enforcement
authority. Criminal antitrust enforcement is the greatest risk to
any individual or business in the health care or any other field.
Since the fear of criminal antitrust enforcement can chill
innovation in the health care field unnecessarily, I suggest fed-
eral antitrust policy expressly:
(a) adopt the Antitrust Division's criminal enforcement poli-
cy;Ire
(b) limit criminal enforcement to per se violations;
(c) state that any person who complies with the Guidelines will
not be subject to criminal enforcement; and
(d) encourage the states to adopt the same policy.
14. Retire Regulatory Remedies, Use Antitrust Remedies.
Ever since the "messenger model" was invented in Maricopa,
health care antitrust has been haunted by regulatory rather than
mainstream antitrust remedies. Basically, mainstream antitrust
remedies are self-executing, and require little or no ongoing
agency or court monitoring or involvement. That is, the recon-
stituted market is the regulator, rather than government offi-
cials. Thus apply mainstream antitrust remedies, and abandon
the temptation of regulatory remedies.
In conclusion, some or all of these changes to federal
antitrust policy will provide a private market elixir with little
risk of anticompetitive side effects for patients or the public.
15. Provide Private Market Insight and Focus. The reality
is that there is widespread confusion and misunderstanding in
health care regarding private markets and antitrust economics.
To illustrate, it is commonly and erroneously assumed in
health policy circles that "big buyers" must exist for private
markets really to work,1"' that patients are inherently inca-
pable of making their own health care decisions, that legisla-
tion that "levels playing fields" usually promotes competition
rather than hinders it,"°2 that "cost shifting," rather than cost
100. See Donald I. Baker, To Indict Or Not To Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion In Sherman
Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1978).
101. Under this theory, of course, the PC market could not exist, since there is no big buyer.
102. It is reported, for example, that some state insurance department regulators and some of
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reduction, is the only option in private markets, that private
markets always consolidate to two or three dominant firms, and
that "HMOs are proxies for competition.""°3 Clarification of
how private markets really work is sorely needed and will
stimulate further private health care reform that will benefit the
public.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the factual reality that suggests
that managed care is likely to evolve along two roads, not one
road leading to HMOs. Conceptually, practically, and legally,
the most important point of divergence between the two roads
concerns premiums: the HMO/insured plan road has premiums
or prepayments; the self-insured road does not. The Article
finds that self-insured ERISA networks have the legal flexibili-
ty and numbers to lead, rather than follow, the move from the
"Model T" to the next generation of managed care, perhaps to
be known by the more patient-friendly and private market
phrase, "Patient Choice."
the regulated, including some HMOs, want to "level the playing field" by regulating their
unregulated competition. See, e.g., NAIC Bulletin to Address Application of Insurance Laws to
Providers Groups," HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), at 1177 (Aug. 3, 1995).
103. For a sampling of these and other subjects, see Charles D. Weller, On "FTC Sings The
Blues" and Its Respondents, 7 J. HEALTH POL'Y, POL. & L. 547 (1982); Charles D. Weller, On
"Palm-Reading the Invisible Hand: A Critical Examination of Pro-Competitive Reform
Proposals," (and Other Such Critiques), 7 J. HEALTH POL'Y, POL. & L. 295 (1982); Charles D.
Weller, Competition and the Cost of Hospital Care, 258 JAMA 2064 (1987); Charles D. Weller,
Clarifying the Competition Strategy, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1988, at 173.
348 [Vol. 6:305
